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Overview 
The biggest mining boom in Australian history since the gold rush 
of the 1850s is about to change shape. The investment phase of 
the boom, which has seen $400 billion invested in the last 
decade, is tapering off. The elevated prices paid for Australian 
mineral exports since 2003 are falling, and with them, the huge 
boost they provided to national income and government revenue. 
As these changes begin to transform the economy once more, 
this report assesses the benefits and costs of the boom, and 
points to what policymakers should and should not do next.  
Overall, the boom has been good for Australia. It helped the 
country weather the global financial crisis. It helped fund major 
government initiatives. Most Australians have prospered.  
But the boom has also provoked fears. Some worry that it has 
benefited mining states, companies and workers, but left the rest 
of the country worse off. Some believe that the high dollar caused 
permanent damage to trade-exposed industries such as 
manufacturing, tourism and international education. Some believe 
the boom will end in a severe recession. Others believe the 
Commonwealth Government mishandled the boom by failing to 
save much of the windfall it has generated. 
This report shows that the first two concerns are largely 
unfounded. Certainly the boom has boosted incomes more in the 
mining states of Western Australia and Queensland and the 
Northern Territory. But in the past decade, incomes have 
increased faster across the country than in the decade before. 
Regions have grown at different rates but few are left worse off. 
Benefits have been spread across the country as the boom 
helped to offset the impacts of globalisation and technological 
change on lower-skilled workers. 
The boom has made life difficult for industries that compete 
internationally. Yet history suggests that manufacturing and other 
trade-exposed industries will bounce back quickly after the boom.  
The concern about a possible recession is less easy to assess. 
There is a risk of a downturn: resources investment will decline, 
and falls in resource prices elsewhere were often followed by 
slower growth. But a recession is far from inevitable, and Australia 
has avoided the big traps in mining booms, such as high inflation. 
The fourth community concern is well-founded. The 
Commonwealth Government has not saved enough of the 
proceeds of the boom. Tax decreases and spending increases 
have been larger than Australia can afford in the long run. Some 
spending was justified by the response to the global financial 
crisis, and some has been invested, but underlying budget deficits 
now need to be repaired in more difficult times. 
Australian governments need to do more to tighten their budgets, 
which will permit them to respond strongly if the outlook darkens. 
Governments should resist temptations to protect industries, but 
continue to invest in skills and education to help workers and 
citizens respond to the changing risks and opportunities of a 
globalised economy. These will be even more important as the 
longest and largest mining boom in 150 years winds down. 
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1. The boom: its contents and discontents 
1.1 The mining boom shaped Australia’s economy over 
the last decade 
It is our biggest mining boom since the 19th Century gold rush. In 
the decade to 2011, rapid growth in Chinese demand for iron ore, 
coal and other minerals – adding to demand from Australia’s 
traditional mining export destinations, Japan and South Korea – 
more than tripled the prices Australia gets for its minerals (Figure 
1.1).1 
The historic increase in Australia’s terms of trade – the prices paid 
for Australian exports, divided by the prices paid for imports – 
increased national income, government revenue, and the income 
of ordinary Australians (Figure 1.2). From 2000 to 2012, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) – the volume of what Australia produced 
– grew by around 44 per cent, but real Gross National Income 
(GNI) – the value of ‘dollars in our pockets’ – grew by around 63 
per cent. The terms of trade improvement alone directly increased 
national income by around 13 per cent over that time. 
                                            
1 Battellino (2010) 
Figure 1.1: Commodity prices, terms of trade and exchange rate  
Indices (1982=100) 
 
Note: Commodity price index is in SDR; Exchange rate is real trade-weighted. 
Source:  RBA (2013a), RBA (2013b), Series FRERTWI; ABS (2012d), Table1. 
The boom can be usefully divided into three overlapping phases: 
the price increases that began in 2003 and peaked in 2011; the 
investment phase that grew strongly from 2006 and peaked 
around this year; and the period of output growth, which is 
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expected to continue for some years as resource extraction and 
export facilities are completed.2  
Figure 1.2: Real GDP, GDI and GNI 
Index (2000=100) 
s
 
Note:  GDP = the value of output produced in Australia assuming constant prices. GDI: 
= GDP adjusted for changes in the prices of exports and imports. GNI = GDI 
adjusted for net earnings of Australian residents offshore and of non-residents in 
Australia. GNI has closely tracked GDI in part because the retention and 
investment by mining companies of earnings has not yet resulted in recognition 
in the national accounts of an increase in non-resident income of offshore 
portfolio investors.  
Source:  ABS (2012b), Table 30. 
                                            
2 Bishop, et al. (2013) provides an analysis of the three phases.  
Figure 1.3: Exports by sector 
$b 
 
Note:  Nominal exports deflated by the GDP deflator. 
Source: ABS (2013f), Tables 5 & 11a. ABS (2012d). 
In the first phase, price rises boosted the value of mining exports. 
Figure 1.3 shows that mining export revenue more than doubled 
from 2004 to 2008.  
As confidence grew that strong resources demand would endure, 
mining companies reinvested their returns to grow capacity.3 
Before the boom, mining made up about 10 per cent of business 
                                            
3 New discoveries, especially in gas, also contributed to the investment boom 
(Wood and Carter (2013). 
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Figure 1.4: Business investment value by sector 
Per cent of GDP (private, nominal) 
 
Source: ABS (2012d), Table 1 and Table 52.  
 
investment in dollar terms; today it is about 40 per cent, as Figure 
1.4 shows. To build extraction, processing and transport 
infrastructure for gas, coal, and iron ore and other minerals, more 
than $400 billion was invested from 2003 to 2012, with around 
$80 billion a year in the past three years. In the past eight years, 
more mining investment was undertaken in Australia than in any 
other country (Figure 1.5). 
Figure 1.5: Global mining investment 
US$b, nominal 
 
Source:  Engineering and Mining Journal Project Survey (2013); ABS (2012d) 
As a result of the mining price and investment surge, nearly a fifth 
of all production in Australia is now in or for the mining sector, by 
dollar value. Mining’s direct share of GDP more than doubled in 
the past decade, to 11 per cent. When the output of sectors such 
as construction and professional services that sell to mining is 
added, the sector is responsible for around 18 per cent of nominal 
GDP, up from just 9 per cent before the boom.4 
                                            
4 Rayner and Bishop (2013) 
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Figure 1.6: Growth in real value added by sector 
Annual real growth, 2000-2012 (per cent) 
 
Note: Tourism (tradable) split across multiple categories. 
Source:  ABS (2012d), Table 5. 
However, as Figure 1.6 shows, output also grew strongly in non-
tradable sectors that do not sell much to the mining sector (such 
as health), but were purchased by consumers and governments 
with incomes boosted by the boom. By contrast, trade-exposed 
sectors like manufacturing and tourism grew little.  
The relative decline of the trade-exposed sectors other than 
mining and the rise of non-tradable sectors is a hallmark of terms 
of trade booms. Growing incomes drove demand for both 
tradables and non-tradables. Strong demand for non-tradables 
pushed up prices and returns to producers, because only local 
producers could deliver them. At the same time, imports could 
meet growing demand for tradable goods. Australian producers of 
tradables, forced to match world prices, were unable to pass on 
rising costs and have lost competitiveness.5 Non-tradable prices 
have risen almost 70 per cent since 2000, while tradable prices 
have risen less than 10 per cent (Figure 1.7).6  
Figure 1.7: Prices of tradables and non-tradables 
CPI components; indices (2000=100) 
 
Note: Tradables excludes food and automotive fuel.  
Source:  ABS (2012f), Table 7; RBA Table G2. 
                                            
5 Corden (2012); Gregory (2011). 
6 Bishop, et al. (2013), chart 6 shows that growth in the price of non-tradables 
relative to tradables increased when the terms of trade began to rise in 2003. 
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The decade of the resources boom, then, has been a decade of 
significant economic shifts: prices, profitability, output, exports, 
and investment across sectors have all been affected. But while 
average incomes also rose, not all Australians see the boom as a 
good news story. A sense of insecurity has inevitably 
accompanied rapid economic change. It was exacerbated by the 
impact of the global financial crisis on household wealth. Looking 
ahead, many worry that Australia could be thrown into recession 
as economic growth slows in our major mining customer, China, 
and it ‘rebalances’ from investing in infrastructure and industrial 
capacity towards consumption of consumer goods and services.7  
Consequently many Australians remain anxious about the state of 
the economy and their personal prospects. This anxiety is often 
expressed as concern about the effects of the mining boom.  
1.2 Community concerns about the boom 
Broadly, there are three significant community concerns about the 
mining boom. The first is that the boom is great for miners, but 
has left other workers and communities behind. According to one 
poll, most Australians recognise the mining sector’s importance to 
the economy.8 Yet at the same time, Figure 1.8 suggests that 
most Australians believe the boom has not benefited them 
personally – and has even driven up the cost of living. 
The second concern is that the boom has turned Australia into a 
‘quarry economy’, and that the persistently high dollar has 
                                            
7 Garnaut (2013b) 
8 Newspoll (2013) 
permanently damaged industries that will be needed once the 
boom ends.  
The third concern is that the boom leaves the Australian economy 
vulnerable; that when the boom ends, economic growth will fall 
sharply. Accordingly, the argument goes, governments should 
have saved more of the windfall from the boom to cushion against 
this shock.  
The next three chapters seek to establish whether these concerns 
are justified. 
Figure 1.8: Community perceptions of personal impacts of the 
mining boom 
 
Source: SBS (2012)  
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2. The mining boom: only good for miners? 
This chapter examines concerns that the resource boom only 
helped mining states, companies and workers, while leaving other 
states, firms and workers worse off. In particular, we ask:  
• How has the boom affected wages, incomes and employment 
in Australia? 
• Have non-resource states and regions been excluded from the 
benefits of the boom? 
• How do the impacts of the boom compare to other forces 
affecting income distribution and disadvantage? 
We find that, contrary to fears, the benefits of the boom have 
been widespread. On average, wages and household incomes 
have grown strongly through the boom. The spread of full time 
earnings broadened, but the boom has increased wages in less 
skilled occupations. Unemployment remains low and the rate at 
which firms lay off workers has changed little. 
Households and workers in both rmining states and other states 
have benefited from the boom.  
By pushing up the dollar, the boom has accelerated the reshaping 
of the manufacturing sector. Yet even amongst regional centres 
that have lost manufacturing and tourism jobs, only in a minority 
did employment decline as a share of population.  
2.1 Wages, incomes and employment have grown strongly 
during the boom 
Since 2000, Australian GDP, wages, household incomes and 
employment have all grown steadily and strongly. The mining 
boom has contributed directly to wage and income growth in two 
main ways.  
First, the doubling of the terms of trade – the prices paid for our 
exports compared to the prices we pay for imports – has raised 
national income substantially, as Figure 1.2 shows. In the 2000s 
the terms of trade kept real income growth above 2 per cent, 
despite slowing productivity growth (Figure 2.1). The additional 
income ended up in people’s pockets via wages, business income 
and dividends, and through the tax-transfer system.  
The rising real exchange rate has transferred income from miners 
and from the producers of other trade-exposed goods and 
services to consumers. Consumers pay lower prices for traded 
goods and services. As incomes have risen, so has household 
spending on discretionary items.9 
 
                                            
9 Phillips, et al. (2012) 
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Figure 2.1: Contributions to growth in average incomes by decade 
Percentage points, annual average  
 
Source: Gruen and Dolman (2012), Chart 1.   
Second, increasing mining activity and the very large increase in 
investment have contributed to steady growth in employment and 
output well beyond the mining sector, particularly in the period 
after the global financial crisis, as Section 1.1 sets out.10   
  
                                            
10 Stevens (2013) 
2.2 Wages and incomes have increased broadly, with 
some rise in inequality 
Lower-income workers have shared in the benefits of the boom, 
but higher-earning workers have done even better: inequality of 
wages has increased, particularly among men (Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2: Growth in real weekly full-time earnings by decile 
Per cent growth (2000-2011) 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012g) 
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Chart 1: Contributions to growth in average incomes by decade 
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The underlying causes of rising wage inequality are not clear. 
Wages have also become more unequal in other OECD 
countries.11 Changes in technology may be part of the 
explanation, though as shown in Section 2.5, the income gap 
between highly skilled and less skilled workers has not risen as 
much in Australia as elsewhere.12  
There is little evidence that the mining boom has contributed 
much to rising wage inequality in Australia. As Section 2.5 shows, 
the investment phase of the boom may have increased wages for 
workers with relatively low formal educational qualifications.  
Unemployment, a major driver of disadvantage and social 
exclusion, fell below 6 per cent at the start of the resources boom 
in 2002-3 and averaged 5.2 per cent from 2009 to 2012. Long-
term unemployment has also remained low.13 An increase in 
labour force participation has supported lower income households 
while increasing the number of workers on relatively low wages.14  
Partly as a result, household income inequality (Figure 2.3) has 
grown less than the full time earnings inequality (Figure 2.2).  
                                            
11 OECD (2011), Daley, et al. (2013); Greenville, et al. (2013). Mining wages 
rose strongly and hospitality and tourism wages fell during the boom (Lowe 
(2012), which may have contributed to the widening of the wage distribution.   
12 Autor, et al. (2008); OECD (2011); Autor (2011) 
13 The rate of underemployment did not improve substantially through the period 
(Borland (2011), Figure 22). The fraction of the population on disability support 
rose through the 1990s until the early 2000s but has remained almost 
unchanged since 2003.  
14 Connolly (2011), Borland (2011) Figure 4. Much of the increase in labour force 
participation was among older workers (Borland (2011), Figure 9) and in lower 
income households (Greenville, et al. (2013) Figure 3.11). This probably 
supported the growth in measured wage inequality.  
Figure 2.3: Growth in household post-tax real income 
Per cent growth, 2000 – 2010, mean of quintile 
 
Note:  Growth between financial years 1999-2000 to 2009-10. The ABS changed its 
measure of income in 2006 to include fringe benefits, which may affect the 
comparability of income in different periods.  
Source:  ABS (2011a), Detailed tables, 2009-10.  
Nor are job turnover rates unusually high. Section 3 below shows 
that tourism, manufacturing and other sectors that compete 
internationally have been under pressure. Yet aggregate rates of 
job turnover have changed little. Figure 2.4 shows that layoffs 
(‘involuntary separations’) did increase somewhat as the economy 
slowed at the time of the global financial crisis. The resumption of 
the mining boom helped to maintain economic growth after the 
financial crisis and so is likely to have limited the rise in layoffs.  
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Figure 2.4: Rate of job changes by cause 
Proportion of those employed at some stage in the year (per cent) 
 
Note: Breaks in data are interpolated.  Voluntary separations exclude workers who 
have changed locality but not employer.   
Source:  ABS (2012i) 
2.3 Workers and households in non-mining states have 
benefited from the boom 
The mining boom has supported rapid output growth in the mining 
states of Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern 
Territory (Figure 2.5). The dollar value of output in mining states 
has grown by over 120 per cent, compared to 63 per cent in the 
non-mining states. The difference in growth in real output per 
person is much smaller but still striking: 20 per cent in the 
Figure 2.5: Economic growth and its drivers in mining and non-
mining states  
Indices (2002-03 = 100) 
 
Note: Mining states are Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory.  
Source:  ABS (2012a), Table 4 (population), ABS (2012f) Table 5; ABS (2013d) Table 
13A-G; ABS (2011a)– Detailed tables 2009-10 table 1.1 A; ABS (2012c) Table 1. 
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result, wages and incomes have grown faster in the mining states. 
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Figure 2.6: Wages and incomes in mining and non-mining states 
Average annual growth (per cent) 
 
Note:  GSP is deflated using ABS GSP deflators. Wages include full and part-time 
workers; series deflated using the relevant capital city CPI.  
Source:  ABS (2012a), Table 4, ABS (2012f) Table 5; ABS (2013d), Table 13A-G; ABS 
(2012c), Table 1; ABS (2012c), (report version) 2002-03 and 2011-12; RBA G12.  
interstate migration and fly-in, fly-out workers.15 Household 
income per person grew faster in the mining states: over 4 per 
cent per year, compared to 2.8 per cent in other states.  
Nevertheless, wages and household incomes have continued to 
grow even in non-mining states. Wage growth has been just as 
rapid in the non-mining states during the boom as before. 
                                            
15 Lowe (2012) 
Figure 2.7: Unemployment rate in mining and non-mining states 
Per cent of the labour force 
 
Source: ABS (2013g),Table 12.  
 
Household incomes in non-mining states grew significantly faster 
during the mining boom years than in the seven years before, as 
Figure 2.6 shows.  
Nor has unemployment differed much between non-mining and 
mining states. Figure 2.7 shows that from 2002 to 2008, 
unemployment fell faster in the mining states than elsewhere, 
before rising more sharply from 2008 to 2010, during a pause in 
mining investment. By 2012, unemployment rates in the two 
groups of states were almost identical.  
 Even though mining-states benefited more from the boom, real 
household disposable income of non-mining states still grew much 
quicker than prior to the boom. 
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2.4 The boom has disadvantaged a few regional centres 
Some smaller regional centres have done better than others 
through the boom. As Figure 2.8 shows, towns with rapidly 
growing trade-exposed industries -- particularly mining -- tended 
to have rapid overall employment growth between 2006 and 2011.  
But even amongst regional centres with rapidly shrinking trade-
exposed industries, most still experienced rising employment, 
thanks to steady economy-wide growth. Only 14 centres, with a 
combined population of 600,000, experienced falls in employment 
as a share of population, and no centre lost more than 2 per cent 
employment share.16  
                                            
16 Lowe (2012) shows that the spread of unemployment rates across 
regions declined during the boom (Graph 6, p 105). There were larger 
falls in manufacturing employment in NSW and VIC than in WA and QLD 
(Borland (2011), Figure 23).  
Figure 2.8: Changes in tradables and total employment in regional 
centres  
Change in employment shares 2006-2011 (per cent of population)   
 
Note:  All regional centres with population between 15,000 and 300,000. Tradables are 
manufacturing, accommodation and foodservice, and mining. Agriculture 
excluded due to volatility. 
Source:  ABS (2007), ABS (2012e).  
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2.5 The boom has supported wage growth for workers 
with lower formal qualifications !
Those in the bottom 20 per cent have generally prospered 
through the boom, but not as much as those at the top. Even so, 
strong demand from mining has countered a trend, visible 
internationally and in Australia, towards increasing inequality, and 
a widening gap between those with and without formal 
educational qualifications.  
Industries that employ more highly educated workers have tended 
to grow faster, as shown in Figure 2.9. Industries with fewer 
tertiary educated workers have created fewer jobs; and 
unemployed workers are more likely to report that their previous 
jobs were in those industries.17  
The broader trend towards jobs requiring more education is also 
evident in higher employment growth in skilled occupations, as 
Figure 2.10 shows. Management and professional employment 
grew by 50 per cent from 1997 to 2011. Labouring and sales 
employment grew by just 5 per cent.   
Yet despite big differences in job growth across skill levels, wage 
growth has been close to uniform.18 That suggests that the supply  
                                            
17 For discussion of the relationship between technology, occupations, education 
and earnings, see Goldin and Katz (2008); Borland (2011); Autor (2010); Autor 
(2011); Acemoglu and Autor (2012); Autor, et al. (2012).  
18 At first sight, this result may seem inconsistent with the increase in wage 
inequality noted above, but wage inequality is also affected by changing shares 
of workers at different wage rates and by the growth of enterprise bargaining, 
which supported larger variation in wages across industries and firms. 
Figure 2.9: Educational qualifications: high and low-growth 
industries 
Per cent of workforce in 2011  
 
Note: Growth in gross value added, chain volumes from 2002 to 2012. High growth 
industries are Mining, Utilities, Health, Professional and scientific, Wholesale, 
Construction, Education, Public Sector, Arts and Recreation and Finance. Low 
growth industries are Agriculture, Manufacturing, Other Services, Retail, 
Transport, IT & Media, Hospitality, Real Estate, and Administration.  
Source:  ABS (2012e); ABS (2012h) Table 11 and UQ2_may-01 data cube.  
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Figure 2.10: Employment and real wage by occupational skill level  
Growth from 1997 to 2011, per cent 
 
Source:  ABS (2012g), Data Cube Employee Earnings Time Series (03/04/07);ABS 
(2012g), Data Cube Employee Earnings Mean Time Series;ABS (2012f), Tables 
1 & 2; 1220.0, Data Cubes; ABS (2012h), Data Cube E08_aug96; ABS (2013a), 
Data Cubes; ABS (2009) 
of more skilled labour has grown in line with demand, while wage 
growth has remained strong in low-skilled occupations because 
there were relatively few people to do these jobs.19  
                                            
19 As shown in Daley, et al. (2013), Figure 30, the higher education earnings 
premium in Australia remained steady from 2000 to 2010 while the OECD 
average increased sharply. Skilled migration made a significant contribution: 
Connolly and Spence (2011); Borland (2011) Fig 11.  
 
Figure 2.11: Real wage by occupational skill level  
Annual growth, per cent 
 
Source: per Figure 2.10. 
The upskilling of the Australian workforce is a significant success 
story, but the mining boom also helped support wages in less 
skilled occupations. Figure 2.11 shows that wage growth for lower 
skilled occupations was typically higher from 2006 and 2011 than 
from 1997 to 2006. The reverse is true for high skilled 
occupations. The investment phase of the mining boom (which 
began in around 2005 and persists to the present) may have 
supported rapid wage growth for labourers, machinery operators, 
and technicians and trades, all of whom are heavily represented 
in mining and construction.  
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Figure 2.12: Unemployment, employment growth, and tertiary 
education by industry 
Per cent 
 
Notes: Growth is for the period (2001-2012). Unemployment is the industry of last 
employment reported by the unemployed; average 2001-2012. 
Source:  ABS (2012e)); ABS (2012h)Table 11 and UQ2_may-01 data cube 
Further evidence that the mining boom supported wages for less 
formally skilled workers is shown in Figure 2.12: few workers in 
mining have tertiary degrees, and mining employment grew 
rapidly. Construction employed many more workers without 
tertiary qualifications and grew relatively fast in the decade to 
2012, partly in response to the growth in mining investment. 
Nevertheless lower levels of education continue to be a significant 
factor in unemployment, as shown by the right side of Figure 2.12.  
2.6 To address disadvantage, government should focus 
on transition, skills and participation 
The benefits of the mining boom have been substantial and 
widespread. The increase in the terms of trade has supported 
steady income and wage growth despite weak productivity 
growth.  Non-mining states have enjoyed income growth that was 
faster than before the boom.  
The generally buoyant conditions of the mining boom have 
supported strong employment growth and an increase in labour 
force participation, particularly among older workers and workers 
on lower incomes. Even amongst regional centres that have lost 
jobs in manufacturing and tourism, only a minority have had a fall 
in the proportion of the population in work. 
Many of the jobs created in the mining investment boom have 
required relatively low formal qualifications. This may have offset 
longer-run forces that favour highly educated workers. Such 
support cannot be relied on in the next phase of the boom: as 
investment ramps down, wages and opportunities for less 
educated workers may grow more slowly. This is why work to 
strengthen the Australian education system remains vital.  
To ensure widespread benefits from the next phase of the boom, 
policymakers should not seek to defend particular industries or 
regions.20 In addition to broader policies supporting productivity, 
flexibility and growth, policymakers should focus on labour force 
participation and on helping workers to improve skills and adapt to 
economic change.
                                            
20 Daley and Lancy (2011) 
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3. Has the boom has turned Australia back into a quarry?
The resources investment boom has put pressure on other 
industries. The high exchange rate linked to the mining boom has 
disadvantaged firms that export or compete with imports. The high 
dollar also provoked fears the boom has permanently damaged 
industries such as tourism and manufacturing. A trade unionist, a 
business group representative and a journalist express this view:  
“We need to make sure that we keep this industry alive 
because if we don't, the impact on manufacturing centres 
across Australia will be drastic, it'll be severe and it’ll create a 
type of society that I don't think most Australians want.”   
Paul Howes, Australian Workers’ Union21 
"We have grave concerns that there could be a hollowing out 
of the economy. And when the dollar depreciates, when the 
resources boom drops off in the future, we will not have the 
industry structure that we have today."  
Tony Webber, Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries22 
“When the commodity boom ends, manufacturing income will 
not rebound…. The death of manufacturing is the permanent 
loss of the skills and intellectual property that enables such a 
ramp up to occur.” 
David Llewellyn Smith, Macrobusiness23  
                                            
21 Paul Howes, Australian Workers’ Union, interview transcript ABC (2011). 
22 Tony Webber, Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, quoted in Hoy 
(2013) 
23 Llewellyn-Smith (2013) 
In this chapter we ask: 
• How have the trade-exposed sectors fared through the boom?  
• Is the boom the main driver of change in these sectors?  
• Has the boom cause long-term damage to industries and 
capabilities that will be needed after the boom is over? 
We find that the main trade-exposed sectors, notably 
manufacturing, tourism, education of overseas students, and 
agriculture, have survived the boom in reasonable shape. They 
are producing goods and services at or above their levels prior to 
the boom. Agriculture and education exports have grown strongly, 
reflecting strong demand from the same growing Asian 
economies that have driven the mining boom. Yet tourism and 
manufacturing output have hardly grown over the period, and their 
exports experienced outright declines after 2008. 
Aside from agriculture, these trade-exposed sectors grew more 
slowly than the rest of the economy. With mining expanding 
rapidly, and strong demand for non-traded goods and services, 
the GDP share of other trade-exposed sectors has declined. 
Yet the mining boom is not the prime cause of manufacturing’s 
declining share of GDP. Rather, the boom has temporarily 
accelerated a long-term decline. Manufacturing has declined as a 
proportion of the economy in Australia and most other high-
income economies for decades. As incomes have risen, 
The mining boom: impacts and prospects 
 
Grattan Institute 2013 20 
households have spent more on services. The shift to an open 
Australian economy with lower tariffs that began in the mid-1970s 
has also played a role. As well, the global manufacturing sector 
has relocated much of the manufacture of less complex goods to 
China and other economies where costs are lower.  
The boom has even helped parts of manufacturing industry. 
Demand from the resource sector for Australian manufacturing 
sector output has risen by about 0.6 per cent of GDP through the 
decade, partly offsetting the pressure caused by the high 
exchange rate.24 At the same time, Australian production and 
export of more sophisticated manufactures (including technical 
equipment and pharmaceuticals) and new services has continued 
to grow strongly during the boom. 
The experience of other countries that have been through a big 
shift in exchange rates suggests that Australian manufacturing is 
unlikely to have suffered permanent damage. If exchange rates 
decline, manufacturing is likely to bounce back to trend within a 
few years. Services exports are likely to respond strongly, too.  
Yet the experience of comparable countries may not be an 
entirely reliable guide. In those countries, exchange rates were 
typically elevated by about 20 per cent for five years. In Australia, 
the exchange rate has been elevated by more than 30 per cent 
above its pre-boom level for almost a decade.  
What should governments do? The risk of permanent damage to 
the trade-exposed sectors is low and does not warrant temporary 
intervention to protect affected industries. There is little evidence 
                                            
24 Bishop, et al. (2013), Graph A2. 
that intervention to protect or prop up any industry is cost-
effective. Policy to lower the real exchange rate can help, but as 
noted in Section 3.5 the only way to sustain a lower real exchange 
rate is to reduce domestic expenditure. The recent shift towards 
tighter fiscal policy and lower interest rates is helping to achieve 
this. 
3.1 The mining boom has squeezed other tradable 
industries hard 
In dollar terms, the fortunes of the resources sector and other 
tradable industries have been starkly different through the boom, 
as Figure 3.1 shows. High resource commodity prices and the 
high real exchange rate have reduced the share of nominal GDP 
contributed by other trade-exposed sectors. Export shares have 
changed even more starkly. Non-mining exports plummeted from 
around 78 per cent of exports by value in the late 1990s to 50 per 
cent in 2012, while mining rose from around 22 to 50 per cent.25 
 
                                            
25 See Connolly and Atkin ibid. for a review of the experience of Australian 
exports during the high exchange rate period.  
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Figure 3.1: Output and exports: mining and non-mining tradables 
 
Notes: Non-mining tradables GVA include agriculture, manufacturing, tourism (from 
Tourism Satellite Account). Mining includes metal ores and minerals, coal, coke 
and briquettes and other mineral fuels.  Non-mining exports includes all other 
goods and services. GVA excludes ownership of dwellings. 
Source:  ABS (2012d), Table 5; ABS (2013f), Table11a and b and 32a; ABS (2013e), 
Table 7.  
Nevertheless, the volume of goods and services produced in the 
trade-exposed, non-resource sectors did not fall (Figure 3.2). 
Exports of all broad export-oriented sectors remain above their 
2002-03 levels, though below their levels of 2007-8 (with the 
exception of the rural sector). After resources, manufacturing 
remains the largest trade-exposed sector and the largest export 
sector. 
Figure 3.2: Output and exports: non-mining tradable sectors 
$b, chain volumes 
 
Source: ABS (2012d), Table 5; ABS (2013f), Table 11a and b and 32a; ABS (2013e), 
Table 57, 63, 68, 110; ABS (2013c), Table 1.  
 
Investment levels indicate how the trade-exposed sectors regard 
their future prospects. Figure 3.3 shows that investment in 
manufacturing increased through the early 2000s, peaking in 
2006 and then declining somewhat. Yet the fact that the volume of 
investment remains above its level in the late 1990s and early 
2000s suggests that many manufacturing firms see a viable 
future.  
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
1998 2005 2012 
Mining 
Non-mining tradables 
Per cent of nominal GVA 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
1998 2005 2012 
Mining 
Non-mining 
Per cent of nominal exports 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
180 
200 
1998 2005 2012 
Manufacturing 
Tourism 
Gross value added 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
180 
200 
1998 2005 2012 
Exports 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Tourism 
Rural 
Other services 
Education 
Vol me measures (2010/11 prices, billi ) 
The mining boom: impacts and prospects 
 
Grattan Institute 2013 22 
Figure 3.3: Business investment volumes by sector 
Index (2002-03=100) 
 
Source:  ABS (2012d), Table 64.  
Certainly, the non-resources trade-exposed sectors did it tough 
through the boom. Even so, taken as a group they are producing 
more output than before the boom, and they continue to invest. 
 
 
3.2 Factors other than the boom are reshaping Australian 
manufacturing  
The high exchange rate has hurt many trade-exposed 
businesses, including manufacturing. But it would be wrong to 
conclude that the boom is primarily responsible for the relative 
decline of the manufacturing sector, or for the sharper declines of 
individual industries, such as car manufacturing. Longer-term 
trends are at work. 
As Figure 3.4 shows, manufacturing in the high-income 
economies has a long trend of relative decline. Manufacturing 
value-added as a share of GDP has declined in Australia, as in 
most high-income economies, for decades. The manufacturing 
sector lost GDP share more rapidly in Australia than elsewhere in 
some periods, such as when trade barriers were reduced in the 
late 1970s and 1980s. In the 2000s, manufacturing’s relative 
decline continued even in economies that did not experience 
Australia’s exchange rate appreciation. While manufacturing 
remains a significant industry, it would probably have continued to 
lose GDP share even if the mining boom had not occurred.  
Figure 3.4 also shows an apparent contradiction: manufacturing 
exports have trended up as a proportion of GDP in many OECD 
countries. Greater trade and specialisation reflect in part falling 
transport, travel and communication costs and the rise of Asia as 
a market and as a producer, among other factors.26 
                                            
26 Countries where manufacturing accounts for a large proportion of trade (such 
as Singapore) are often have much lower value-add. Businesses import, 
assemble and then re-export goods.  
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Agriculture 
Services 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Index of real investment (2002/03=100) 
Real business investment 
The mining boom: impacts and prospects 
 
Grattan Institute 2013 23 
Figure 3.4: Manufacturing value-added and exports: Australia and 
the OECD 
Per cent of GDP 
 
Note: Manufacturing value-added % GDP and Manufacturing exports % GDP, current 
prices – OECD members in 1970 plus Australia & New Zealand. Manufacturing 
exports chart excludes Luxembourg and Switzerland due to lack of data.  
Source:  The World Bank (1960-2011), OECD Stat STAN Indicators C15T37 
High-income economies focus on sectors in which they have a 
comparative advantage, while lower-income economies focus on 
lower-value products in which labour remains a major cost. Value 
chains have become more complex, with growing trade in 
components and part-finished goods. That explains why  
Figure 3.5: Import prices and employment by manufacturing 
subsector 
Per cent change (2001-2012) 
 
Source:  ABS Cat. 6457.0 Tables 14 and 15; ABS Cat. 6457.0 Tables 1, 3 and 12; ABS 
datacube e06_Aug9; ABS Cat. 6427.0 Table 12. 
manufacturing exports have risen even in economies where 
manufacturing output has fallen as a share of GDP.27 
These shifts in global manufacturing are reflected in the diverse 
outcomes within the diverse Australian manufacturing sector. As 
Figure 3.5 shows, import prices in manufacturing subsectors 
                                            
27 See Kelly and Cava (2013) for an analysis of Australian value-added trade. 
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generally fell over the last decade, in part due to the appreciation 
of the exchange rate.  
But prices varied. Australian manufacturing employment tended to 
fall more in sectors where prices declined more (such as pulp and 
paper and textiles, clothing and footwear) reflecting Australia’s 
declining comparative advantage in those sectors.28   
In a few sectors, prices rose, reflecting strong global demand 
deriving from the same strong Asian growth that supported the 
resources boom. In those sectors, employment declined little or 
even increased. Other factors such as productivity growth 
reduced employment even in some subsectors where prices 
changed little.  
Manufacturing exports have also shifted substantially towards 
higher-skilled sectors, as Figure 3.6 shows. Growth in exports at 
all skill levels has slowed since 2008, due to the high real 
exchange rate and subdued world demand.  
                                            
28 Employment in the US manufacturing sector, too, has been reshaped by the 
rise of China as a manufacturing power (Autor, David H. et al. (2012)). 
Figure 3.6: Manufacturing export volumes by skill level  
Volumes ($b)  
 
Note: Base year is 2011. Reproduced from Connolly, E. and Atkin (2013). Based on 
UNCTADstat definitions; excludes iron and steel exports. 
Source: ABS, RBA; UNCTADstat.  
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3.3 Manufacturing (and other tradable sectors) bounce 
back when the currency falls 
Many are concerned that the high exchange rate caused by the 
mining boom has inflicted permanent damage on trade-exposed 
industries.29 The concern is that even if the exchange rate were to 
drop, industries like manufacturing will not recover lost ground.30  
Leading economist Ross Garnaut expresses concern that there 
will be a delay of some years before strong export growth 
resumes. He writes that “large increases in exports from the 
services, manufacturing and agricultural industries … [have] to be 
preceded by large increases in investment in these industries: you 
cannot fatten a pig on market day”. 31 As he put it in an interview,  
“There are long lead times for investment in these industries. If 
we want strong export growth in four, five or 10 years’ time, the 
investment has to come now.32 
Nevertheless, the experience of other countries that have had big 
shifts in real exchange rates suggests that trade-exposed sectors, 
and manufacturing in particular, will bounce back quickly. We 
identified 13 episodes between 1980 and 2011 in countries 
comparable to Australia in which the real exchange rate rose 
significantly and then fell rapidly, as Figure 3.7 shows.33  
                                            
29 The quotes at the beginning of this chapter provide a sample of views. 
30 This concern is related to the literature on trade hysteresis (Krugman (1987)).  
31 Garnaut (2013a)  
32 Murray (2013) 
33 Section A.1 of the Appendix details the approach for selecting comparable 
economies and identifying episodes.  
Figure 3.7: Exchange rates: episodes of big changes 
Real effective exchange rate index 
 
Note:  Sample of 13 exchange rate episodes in economies comparable to Australia 
Source:  Grattan analysis of data from BIS (2013) and The World Bank (1960-2011). 
In these countries, manufacturing and total exports typically hardly 
grew as a share of GDP in the years of high exchange rates, as 
Figure 3.8 shows.  
But within a year of a large depreciation, manufacturing and 
services exports usually grew rapidly (Figure 3.8). Within three 
years, manufacturing exports as a share of GDP had risen by 
more than a third on average. 
 
Note:  16 episodes were identified for economies comparable to Australia (size, income level, minimum economic diversity) and exchange rate changes that met minimum 
size (uplift and fall) and duration hurdles. Global shocks (eg Asian Crisis) excluded.  
Source: Bank for International Settlements: Narrow weighted EER indicies 1964-2011 (http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer/index.htm); Bruegel Real effective exchange rates for 
178 countries: a new database 
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Figure 3.8: Exports through exchange rate episodes  
Estimated constant-price values, median country, per cent of GDP 
 
Note:  Manufactures series shows 13 countries. Exports are in constant USD at market 
rates; GDP is in constant domestic currency (in order to minimise price effects on 
the ratio of exports to GDP), and thus is close to a volume measure.  
Source:  Grattan analysis of data from BIS (2013) and The World Bank (1960-2011)  
Such a rapid response is consistent with the broader 'open 
economy macroeconomics’ literature on how trade responds to 
changes in the exchange rate.34  
                                            
34 Typically a real depreciation causes export volumes to grow, and import 
volumes to fall. For economies that started with a trade deficit, trade volumes 
change enough to offset the impact of the depreciation on the trade deficit within 
5 to 15 months. This effect is sometimes referred to as the “J-curve”. See 
Figure 3.9: GDP growth through exchange rate episodes 
Annual real GDP growth (per cent) 
 
Source:  Grattan analysis of data from BIS (2013) and The World Bank (1960-2011)  
The growth in exports as a share of GDP after depreciation in 
Figure 3.8 is not due to falling GDP. As Figure 3.9 shows, GDP 
growth typically declined during the period of elevated exchange 
rates, culminating in a GDP contraction in the year of biggest 
depreciation. Yet GDP growth was typically higher in the years 
following the depreciation than before.  
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Over the longer term, manufacturing exports and production 
typically grow back to their long run trend within a few years of the 
end of a period of substantial exchange rate elevation, as Figure 
3.10 shows.  
Therefore temporarily high exchange rates in economies 
comparable to Australia have not had long-lasting effects on 
export volumes and the added value of manufacturing. 
Manufacturing output growth stalls while the exchange rate is 
high.  
The real appreciation of the Australian currency, shown in Figure 
1.1, has been larger and has lasted longer than the median in the 
sample, so the after-effects this time may last longer after any 
future depreciation. But this analysis suggests that output and 
exports usually bounce back rapidly and reach trend within a few 
years.35  
                                            
35 This analysis only shows that should the exchange rate fall, there are grounds 
for expecting a rapid export response and a strong recovery. The analysis does 
not validate any view about future exchange rates – e.g. that the exchange rate 
should or will depreciate. That depends on global demand, resources prices, 
resource export volumes and domestic demand conditions.  
Figure 3.10: Exchange rates, manufacturing output and exports  
Indices (100 = value in year of steepest depreciation) 
 
Note: Manufacturing export volumes are for 13 episodes; manufacturing value-added 
is for 11 episodes for which data is available..  
Source:  Grattan analysis of BIS and World Bank data. 
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3.4 Protecting industries is costly and ineffective 
Some argue that Australian governments should assist vulnerable 
industries through the boom:  
“We have reached a crucial point which demands government 
action in coordination with industry to ensure the sector is 
given the sustained support necessary to emerge through the 
current structural pressures and to prosper beyond the boom”36 
 Heather Ridout, then CEO of the 
Australian Industry Group 
“What we seek to do is to preserve the capabilities in the bad 
times, so that we can expand when conditions improve.” 37 
Senator Kim Carr, Minister for  
Innovation, Industry, Science and Research 
 
However, plausible levels of budgetary support could not have 
maintained manufacturing’s nominal GDP share (or even its 
nominal output value). As Figure 3.11 shows, manufacturing’s 
share of GDP declined far more than the total value of support to 
the industry. Exceptionally large budgetary support, or 
exceptionally high trade barriers, would have been needed to 
offset the various forces driving change in the sector.  
The case against industry protection is well rehearsed.38 Trade 
barriers can protect some trade-exposed industries for a while, 
but they hurt consumers and other industries more. 
                                            
36 Williams (2011) 
37 Carr (2012) 
 
Figure 3.11: Manufacturing gross value added and net government 
assistance 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Note:  Commonwealth assistance only.  
Source: ABS (2012d), Productivity Commission (2012b) Appendix A.  
The cost of government support via subsidies or trade barriers is 
high. Funds have opportunity costs: they could be used to retrain 
workers rather than to prolong careers in unviable sectors. Since 
2003, government has provided more than $63 billion of 
                                                                                     
38 Corden (2012) 
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assistance to the manufacturing sector  – about $70,000 for every 
person employed in manufacturing.39 More of that money could 
have been directed to helping affected workers to restart their 
careers. 
Industry intervention also produces ‘deadweight’ losses: the total 
costs to taxpayers, consumers and other firms and workers 
exceed the benefits to the protected industry. For example, tariffs 
or quotas that increase the costs of traded goods reduce the 
gains from specialisation and trade. Ultimately Australian 
consumers bear the costs in the form of lower living standards.40  
Finally, governments that show a willingness to protect industry 
can find themselves beset by requests for help. Businesses that 
fail to adjust tend to be the ones that ask for support; recipients of 
support that had been seen as temporary tend to ask for 
extensions. When firms see the government giving generous 
assistance with little accountability, they are less likely to innovate 
to improve their viability. Unviable firms waste resources in 
tapping governments for support.41 Government can certainly help 
to address market failures and provide public goods. But 
protecting industries from market prices is almost never the way 
to do it.  
3.5 Exchange rate intervention does not appear warranted 
Some commentators have urged policymakers to depreciate the 
currency to support the trade-exposed sectors. Most have 
                                            
39 Including R&D support. Source: ABS (2013b), Table 3. 
40 Banks (2011) 
41 Ergas (2012) 
focused on interest rate cuts or intervention in foreign exchange 
markets.42  
If the economy is close to full employment, the only way to 
achieve a lasting real depreciation is via policies that reduce 
domestic expenditure. That permits a ‘rebalancing’ of the 
economy, with a smaller non-traded sector and a larger trade-
exposed sector.43  One way to achieve this could be to run tighter 
fiscal policy, offset by lower interest rates. For such a real 
exchange rate depreciation to be effective, an increase in the 
relative price of tradable goods and services must be permitted.44  
At this stage in the boom, with the exchange rate having declined 
somewhat from its peaks, little evidence of large capital inflows, 
the trade balance close to zero, and the prospect of a decline in 
resources investment tending to reduce domestic expenditure in 
future, the case for further intervention now to reduce the real 
exchange rate is not strong. 
3.6 To support growth, government should focus on 
economic stability, while making structural reforms 
Australia’s trade-exposed manufacturing sector is under pressure. 
Concern about the sector’s future is based on the cumulative 
impacts of long-term developments in the world economy, plus 
the more recent pressures of a high real exchange rate.  
                                            
42 van Onselen (2012) 
43 Corden (2012). Denniss and Grudnoff (2012) canvasses one approach of 
slowing down the pace of resources investment.  
44 That may require permitting CPI inflation to exceed its ‘over the cycle’ target 
zone of 2 to 3 per cent for a period. See Garnaut (2013a). 
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Yet the case for costly industry intervention to support specific 
firms or industries is weak. Much of the relative decline would 
have occurred even without a high exchange rate. Australia is 
increasingly specialising and gaining share in more skilled 
manufactures and services. There is little evidence of lasting 
impacts of temporary exchange rate elevations.  
Ultimately, to drive growth, there is no avoiding the conventional 
prescriptions: maintain macroeconomic stability, avoid the 
temptation to subsidise industries in decline, and pursue reforms 
to enhance participation, responsiveness and productivity. In 
these areas there is strong evidence of net benefit. Government 
should focus on them.45
                                            
45 Banks (2012) 
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4. Is our luck running out, and have we failed to save our windfall?
The mining boom has provided Australia with one of the largest 
income boosts in its history. But that bounty brings uncertainty. 
History shows that resources prices can fluctuate sharply. 
Countries with large resources sectors tend to have more uneven 
economic growth and tax revenue over time. Has Australia 
strayed into risky territory? Should it have done more to build a 
buffer against future downturns in resources prices? 
This chapter addresses four questions: 
• Will a larger resources sector subject Australia to large swings 
in GDP and income?  
• Is an economic downturn likely if the terms of trade fall 
sharply?  
• Has Australia saved enough of the windfall from the boom?  
• Can government do more to manage the transition to the next 
phase of growth? 
Economic growth tends to be more variable in countries with 
larger resource sectors. Yet Australia has long been different, 
achieving remarkable stability in recent decades. Its relatively 
well-designed economic institutions and policy practices 
contributed to stability. Preserving them will help manage any 
instability caused by the resources sector.  
The Australian resources boom will not inevitably end in 
recession. In comparable countries, downturns in the terms of 
trade were followed by more frequent recessions and, in some 
cases, prolonged downturns. But countries that pursued good 
macroeconomic management while their terms of trade were 
rising had faster growth after the terms of trade peaked. 
Australia’s economic stability through the boom provides grounds 
for optimism that it will avoid a deep recession. 
Nevertheless, the current Australian terms of trade boom is one of 
the biggest experienced by any comparable economy in the last 
half-century. Investment in Australia’s resources is one of the 
highest, as a share of GDP, of any developed economy. So the 
historical record does not guarantee that an economic contraction 
will be avoided if the terms of trade fall sharply. Even if a 
recession can be avoided, a fall in the terms of trade would 
reduce national income and government tax receipts.  
The Australian Government has not saved enough of the windfall 
from the boom. National saving has been strong, and household 
saving has been high in recent years. But public sector saving 
has been too low. Governments have made spending and tax 
decisions that have produced almost no net savings from a 
decade of elevated resources prices.  
What should government do? A tougher reappraisal of policy to 
drive productivity growth is needed. Public saving should be 
increased now, so that governments are not trying to do so in 
harder times. Careful review of the case for a more 
The mining boom: impacts and prospects 
Grattan Institute 2013 32 
comprehensive minerals resource rent tax is warranted. 
Government should also adjust current budget rules to remove 
the implied licence to spend resource boom windfalls.  
4.1 A larger resources industry will not unsettle the 
Australian economy much 
For a developed economy, Australia is unusually resources-
intensive (that is, resources are a large share of the economy). 
They contribute more to exports and income than in the average 
OECD country, as Figure 4.1 shows. The value of resource 
exports and rents jumped from 2002 as prices rose sharply. 
Output then grew more rapidly, further increasing export values.46  
Yet many people see a downside, worried that the increasing size 
of the Australian resources sector makes the broader Australian 
economy vulnerable to disruption from fluctuating prices, output 
and investment in the resources sector. 
It is true that output and domestic income in resource-intensive 
countries tend to be more variable. Figure 4.2 shows that:  
• More resource intensive economies tend to have less stable 
output and income. 
• Income is more unstable than output and is more affected by 
resource intensity (because resources prices change income 
directly as well as by changing output).  
                                            
46 Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (2013), Figure 9, p.14. 
Figure 4.1: Resource exports & resource rents: Australia and the 
OECD 
Per cent merchandise exports (left); per cent GDP (right) 
 
Note:  Resource exports includes fuel, and ores and metals. Resource rents are a 
World Bank estimate of natural resources revenue minus extraction costs. 
Source:  The World Bank (1960-2011). 
• Resource intensity only accounts for about 20 to 30 per cent 
of economic instability.47  
• Australia has long been a ‘stability star’, with lower volatility 
than almost all other economies.  
                                            
47 Further analysis of the data shows that volatile economies tend to be smaller 
and lower-income, have little diversity, and have poorer quality institutions. 
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Figure 4.2: Resource intensity and economic instability  
Volatility index 
 
Notes:  Volatility index is the standard deviation of real annual per capita growth over 
four decades (difference from 10 year moving average). Resource rents = 
market price minus extraction cost. Regression line is for all 88 countries for 
which data is available for 1970-2010 (output [GDP]) and 1970-2008 (income 
[GDI]), including some outside the charted range. Regression equations: 
 Output volatility = 0.03 + 0.10 * resource rents; t stats 15.4, 5.0; R² = 0.22. 
 Income volatility = 0.04 + 0.23 * resource rents; t stats 10.8, 6.5; R² = 0.33. 
Source: The World Bank (1960-2011), Statistics NZ (2013) Table e1-2  
Australia’s relatively stable economy reflects a mixture of 
relatively good policy institutions and settings, low exposure to 
industries prone to sudden contractions such as capital goods 
manufacturing, and perhaps a degree of luck.48   
Many policy institutions and settings have contributed to stability. 
Over the last decade, the labour market has been flexible enough 
to allow wages to reflect conditions in each sector; wages were 
not set with reference to a leading sector. The value of the dollar 
has adjusted to resource prices, helping to shift demand to 
imports and maintain domestic demand at a level consistent with 
price stability.49 Australia’s relatively low trade barriers have 
allowed producers and consumers of a broad set of tradable 
goods and services to adjust to the appreciating real exchange 
rate. Macro policy settings – interest rates and the fiscal stance –
have contributed to stability by averting recession through the 
global financial crisis, although government budgets should have 
been tighter through the boom, as discussed below. 
Looking ahead, the Australian economy is expected to become 
more resources-intensive. But it has a good prospect of remaining 
one of the most stable economies, so long as other risk factors 
remain well controlled. The current large capital investment 
program is expected to produce minerals volumes that are about 
25 percent above 2002 levels by 2018, and LNG volumes that are 
about 3 times larger than in 2010.50 By then GDP will be about 15 
                                            
48 Williamson and Bhattacharyya (2011) discuss the factors contributing to 
Australia’s relative stability through previous resources booms.  
49 By contrast, Australia experienced inflation during previous booms, including 
the 1970s mining investment boom, when government set the nominal exchange 
rate. See Plumb, et al. (2013) and Gruen (2006). 
50 Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (2013); Gruen (2011); Wood and 
Carter (2013) 
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per cent larger than today if the economy grows at 3 per cent a 
year.  
The resources sector will, then, be larger as a share of GDP. That 
is unlikely to transform Australia into an unstable economy, 
provided that Australia preserves and refines the economic 
institutions and policy settings that have served it well over the 
last decade. 
4.2 Australia does not have all the risk factors for a deep 
downturn, but the risk cannot be ruled out 
The vulnerability that causes the most concern is that the boom 
could come to a sudden stop, triggering a recession.51  
Yet a history of comparable countries suggests that Australia 
does not inevitably face a recession if resource prices fall sharply. 
We analysed twelve episodes of rising and falling terms of trade 
in nine countries comparable to Australia (Note that this set of 
countries is different to the comparator countries with big changes 
in exchange rates discussed in Section 3.3).  
The analysis samples only economies that, like Australia, are 
middle or high-income, resource intensive and economically 
diverse. It identifies every episode of over two years in length in 
which the terms of trade rose by at least ten per cent, then fell by 
                                            
51 Sheehan and Gregory (2012) show that the combination of falling investment 
and falling resources prices could pose a large adjustment challenge. 
at least ten per cent, and remained low for at least two years 
thereafter.52 
Figure 4.3: Terms of trade: episodes of big changes  
Terms of trade index (peak = 100) 
 
Notes:  Based on all 12 episodes of increases of at least 10% in the terms of trade 
lasting at least two years, followed by falls lasting at least two years, experienced 
by any resource-intensive country meeting criteria of similarity to Australia 
(middle-or-high income, medium-or-large and economically diverse.) 
Source: The World Bank (1960-2011); Statistics New Zealand (2011); ABS (2012d), 
Table 1; Grattan analysis.  
                                            
52 Data on resources investment would have been a valuable addition to the 
analysis but was unavailable. Appendix Section A.2 provides detail on the 
methodology.  
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As shown in Figure 4.3, on average the terms of trade increased 
by around 15 per cent in the two years before peaking, then fell 
by just under 15 per cent in the following two years. There were 
some larger booms in the sample. The current Australian terms of 
trade boom has run for longer, and risen higher, than most of the 
sample. 
Figure 4.4: GDP growth through terms of trade episodes 
Real GDP per capita growth (terms of trade peak = 100) 
 
Note: Based on all 12 episodes of increases of at least 10% in the terms of trade 
lasting at least two years, followed by falls lasting at least two years, experienced 
by any resource-intensive country meeting criteria of similarity to Australia 
(middle-or-high income, medium-or-large and economically diverse. 
Source: The World Bank (1960-2011); Statistics New Zealand (2011); ABS (2012d), 
Table 1; Grattan analysis.  
As Figure 4.4 shows, GDP per capita growth was typically lower 
after the terms of trade peaked. Recessions were more frequent 
and rapid growth less frequent in the years following a terms of 
trade peak (Table 4.1). Three-quarters of the sample experienced 
at least one year of negative year-on-year growth. 
Table 4.1: Frequency of recession and rapid growth  
Years per decade 
 Years in decade  
after a terms of trade booma   
Years in  
median decaded 
Deep recessionb 2.0 1.6 
Rapid growthc 1.0 2.2 
Notes: a) Decade from three years prior to the terms of trade peak to six years after the 
peak. b) Years per decade with negative year-on-year real GDP per capita 
growth). c) Years per decade (1960-2011) with year-on-year real GDP per capita 
growth greater than 4%. d) Median of decade averages (eg 1960-69, 1970-79). 
Sources: The World Bank (1960-2011); Statistics New Zealand (2011) (GDP); Statistics 
New Zealand (2012) (CPI); Grattan analysis.  
Terms of trade booms that were followed by slower or negative 
economic growth were almost always associated with high 
inflation in the boom period, as Figure 4.5 shows. Countries that 
had high inflation during the boom struggled to deal with the 
shock of lower prices for their exports at the end of a boom. A 
larger boom (and bust) of the terms of trade is also associated 
with slower subsequent growth. 
Factors other than resources prices and inflation also affected 
growth in these countries. The Latin American debt crisis slowed 
growth sharply in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s. 
Disinvestment and sanctions as part of the international campaign 
to end apartheid slowed growth in South Africa in the 1980s. 
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Figure 4.5: Correlates of GDP per capita growth after terms of trade 
peaks  
 
Notes:  a) Average elevation of the TOT above its 21 year moving average, per cent. b) 
Average annual GDP deflator increase during the period of the terms of trade 
boom (except NZ, where CPI is used). c) Cumulative growth in real GDP per 
capita in the 6 years after the terms of trade peak, per cent of starting value.  
  * Affected by Latin American debt crisis or sanctions (South Africa).  
Sources: The World Bank (1960-2011); Statistics New Zealand (2011) (GDP); Statistics 
New Zealand (2012) (CPI); Grattan analysis 
In summary, booms followed by drops in the terms of trade are 
indeed linked to output growth slowdowns and more frequent 
recessions. Yet other factors play a significant role.53 Many 
                                            
53 Atkinson (2003) observes: “the countries where growth has lagged are those 
where the combination of natural resource, macroeconomic and public 
expenditure policies have led to a low rate of genuine saving”.  
economies that kept inflation low during the terms of trade boom 
grew strongly in subsequent years. Australia was one of them.54 
There are grounds for cautious optimism that Australia will avoid a 
sharp slowdown even if the terms of trade fall sharply. While the 
boom in Australian minerals prices and investment is 
exceptionally large, Australia lacks some of the risk factors for a 
hard landing. Policies to permit adjustment and macro stability 
while the boom persists may prove vital to Australia’s growth 
performance in the event that the terms of trade fall.  
4.3 Government should save the benefits from a resource 
price windfall 
How much should government save of what could prove to be a 
temporary windfall, and what form should that saving take?  
Governments in resource-intensive economies are usually 
advised to build a buffer during the initial period of elevated 
resources prices. As a recent IMF report put it, “a cautious 
approach – which maintains fiscal buffers while gradually 
incorporating new information to allow a smooth adjustment to 
potentially permanently higher prices – is a sensible way 
forward”.55  
There are three main rationales for higher public sector saving 
when the terms of trade are unusually high. First, saving during 
the boom means that levels of government expenditure on 
                                            
54 Gruen (2006) shows that inflation was not as well controlled in the Australian 
boom of the 1970s as the current boom.  
55 International Monetary Fund (2012). See also Venables (2011), Collier and 
Venables (2009), OECD (2008). 
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welfare and services are smoother over time, instead of payments 
rising during the boom and falling afterward. Saving reduces the 
risk that governments will need to make painful spending cuts or 
raise taxes increases if the terms of trade fall. Governments that 
do not automatically pass on gains in revenue in the form of tax 
cuts or increased spending help households maintain smoother 
expenditures over time.56 Although households could save more 
during the boom (and aggregate household saving has increased 
strongly since 2008), many households lack this discipline.57 It 
can also be fairer to future generations to save part of large terms 
of trade windfalls that derive from exhaustible resources.58 
The second rationale for higher public sector saving during a 
terms of trade boom is that it reduces the risk that governments 
will run up large liabilities should the terms of trade fall. 
Governments find it difficult to prune expenditures and 
entitlements and to increase taxes. Their budgets can easily fall 
into deficit as the terms of trade fall, even if output growth 
continues at normal levels.  
Finally, saving while the terms of trade is high may also relieve 
pressure on trade-exposed industries by reducing the real 
exchange rate, as noted above in Section 3.5. Assuming that 
households do not fully offset changes in public sector saving, 
higher public sector saving would result in depreciation of the real 
                                            
56 The Treasury’s ‘wellbeing framework’ includes ‘the overall level and allocation 
of risk’ and ‘the sustainability of opportunities over time’ as two of its five 
dimensions (Gorecki and Kelly (2012)).  
57 The usual arguments against paternalism apply to the smoothing of transfers 
and taxation – see Shafir (2008) for a discussion of behavioural economics and 
policy.  
58 See Van Der Ploeg (2012) and Hartwick (1977). 
exchange rate, and reduce price pressure on trade-exposed 
industries such as manufacturing.59  
Government must decide how much to save of the windfall from 
the terms of trade before it knows how big the windfall will be. 
Setting a target stock for public sector wealth might accommodate 
this uncertainty. In the early phases of a period of strong terms of 
trade, government should seek to increase the stock of public 
sector wealth. Once this stock is a material fraction of the 
cumulative benefit from the terms of trade, government should 
feel more comfortable in gradually increasing public sector service 
provision and transfers, or in making tax reductions. 
A few governments in countries with large resources sectors have 
developed approaches to save commodity price windfalls. Chile, a 
major copper exporter, has explicit budgetary rules for revenues 
related to copper prices.60 Norway reserves its oil revenues 
largely into a sovereign wealth fund, which now stands at over 
160 per cent of GDP.61 The funds are invested offshore, helping 
to reduce domestic expenditure and thereby limit the rise in the 
real exchange rate. 
A less frugal treatment of Australia’s commodity price windfall can 
be defended. Australia came into the boom with low net public 
sector debt and has had high economy-wide saving, especially in 
recent years (see Section 4.4 below). Australia is expected to 
mine iron ore and coal for longer than Norway is expected to 
                                            
59 The effectiveness of this approach depends on whether domestic expenditure 
is reduced. See Corden (2012) for a discussion.  
60 de Mello (2008); de Gregorio and Labbé (2011); Frankel (2011); Fuentes 
(2012) 
61 Bjerkholt and Niculescu (2004); Gruen and Garton (2012) 
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pump oil and gas.62 Mining’s contribution to exports and to the 
budget is smaller in Australia than in Norway and Chile. Australian 
tax revenues from mining may rise even if the terms of trade fall, 
because gas, coal and iron ore output will probably rise strongly. 
There is also the concern that very large stocks of public sector 
wealth could reduce the public appetite for economic reforms that 
would increase incomes.  
But as the next section shows, the Commonwealth Government 
actually saved little of the windfall.  
4.4 Australian governments have not saved much of the 
windfall from the boom 
Governments that enjoy resource windfalls tend to give away or 
consume too much, and save too little.63 In the first decade of the 
current boom, the Commonwealth Government has followed this 
pattern. 
There is no broad national crisis of under-saving during the boom. 
The left panel of Figure 4.6 shows that the gap between national 
investment and national savings narrowed in 2008 and has 
remained low since then. National saving as a percentage of GDP 
in Australia actually strengthened over the decade.64 The right 
                                            
62 Gruen and Garton (2012) 
63 Venables (2011) 
64 See Bishop and Cassidy (2012) for a recent assessment of national saving 
and investment. Since 2009 the Australian national saving rate has exceeded 
those across most of the developed world, including Canada (where resources 
investment is also high), Germany and Japan (traditionally high-saving 
economies). Australia’s national saving rate has been about double the rate in 
the UK and the US (IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013). 
panel shows that net foreign liabilities (particularly debt) have 
increased somewhat as a percentage of GDP during the boom. It 
not a cause for concern that the largest investment boom in 
Australia’s history should result in a rise in foreign liabilities 
alongside a very large increase in the capital stock. 
Figure 4.6: National saving, investment and foreign liabilities 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Note:  Investment includes all sectors Gross Fixed Capital Formation, net changes in 
inventories, acquisitions less disposals of non-produced non-financial assets and 
statistical discrepancy. Saving is National Gross Saving and Net Capital 
Transfers. 
Source: ABS (2013e), Table 2; ABS (2012d), Table1 and 8. 
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Figure 4.7: Commonwealth income, expenditure and net debt 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Notes: Excludes GST. Expenditure includes national government final consumption 
expenditure, subsidies, secondary income payable, and gross fixed capital 
formation. Income includes national government gross operating surplus, taxes 
on production and imports, total property income receivable, secondary income 
receivable, and property income payable.  
Source:  ABS (2012d), Table 1, 30, and 32, ABS (2011b), Table 1; Budget 2013-14 Paper 
No.3, Appendix C, table C8 
The Commonwealth Government cash budget position turned 
sharply over the last decade. During generally buoyant conditions 
before the global financial crisis, income exceeded expenditure 
and net debt declined, as Figure 4.7 shows. But with the onset of 
the financial crisis, income fell steeply, and expenditure as a 
percentage of nominal GDP rose somewhat. As a result, net debt 
increased. 
4.4.1 Structural budgets and the terms of trade 
Figure 4.8 shows that the Commonwealth Government cash 
budget balance can be considered as the result of three factors: 
the business cycle (and other temporary factors affecting 
revenues, such as asset prices); the terms of trade; and so-called 
‘structural’ factors, including the combined effects of policy 
settings (whether stemming from active decisions or not) affecting 
tax revenues and expenditures.65  
The business cycle boosted the cash budget position until 2008, 
peaking at over 1 per cent of nominal GDP. Since the downturn, 
the business cycle has tended to drag on budget outcomes.66  
                                            
65 This analysis is based on the recent Treasury estimates of the structural 
budget balance of the Commonwealth Government (Duggan, et al. (2013)), with 
changes as noted below. That paper cautions that structural estimates can be 
useful for “broad guidance”, but are “sensitive to the assumptions and 
parameters underpinning the estimates”. From the ‘structural terms of trade’ 
scenarios used in that paper we selected the one that comes closest to the 
starting value of the terms of trade in 2002-03: their average value between FY 
1985/86 and FY 2010/11, as used by the OECD (2012). The budget value of the 
assumed temporary component of the terms of trade is therefore close to the 
budget value of the uplift from 2002-03. (In fact the OECD average value is 
slightly above the 2002-03 level, so the numbers presented here may be 
underestimates of the value of the terms of trade uplift).  
66 We have included in the business cycle impacts the full value of fiscal stimulus 
(The Treasury (2009)), although some would argue that some of this spending, 
particularly in more recent years, is not truly attributable to the downturn. We 
also added depreciation allowances on company tax receipts, as they grew by 
over 1 percentage point of GDP due to the strong growth in the private sector 
capital stock over the period. These two assumptions increase the estimate of 
the ‘cyclical’ drag on the budget since 2009, and therefore reduce the estimated 
structural deficit.  
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Figure 4.8: Commonwealth underlying cash budget balance and 
aggregate drivers: annual impact 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Note:  Financial years (i.e. 2003 is 2002-03). 2013f is the 2012-13 forecast in the 13-14 
Budget. Stimulus allocated to cyclical; changes in company tax from the decade 
average due to depreciation allocated to cyclical.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Duggan et al. (2013); ABS (2012d) and ABS (2012b).  
The business cycle affected the cash budget position mainly 
through lower tax revenues and the cost of the stimulus 
packages. 
The strengthening terms of trade also provided a boost to the 
budget over the decade, peaking at just under 2.5 per cent of 
GDP, also shown in Figure 4.8. The elevated terms of trade 
increased the real value of taxable income and potential tax 
receipts.  
The estimated ‘structural balance’ of the Commonwealth budget 
progressively declined each year until the most recent year, as 
Figure 4.8 shows. It declined almost 5 percentage points of GDP 
over the nine years from 2002-3. Most of the decline occurred in 
the five years from 2004-5, at a steady pace of about 0.8 of a 
percentage point of GDP a year. There was a 1.5 percentage 
point improvement forecast in the May 2013 budget papers for the 
2012-13 financial year, but even so, the structural balance 
remained more than two percentage points in deficit. Current 
policy settings would result in a cash deficit of over 2 percentage 
points of GDP in 2012-13 if the terms of trade were at their pre-
boom level and the business cycle were ‘at neutral’. 
The estimated structural deficit has exceeded the terms of trade 
uplift every year since 2007-08, as Figure 4.8 shows. The uplift 
from the terms of trade has not been converted into improved 
cash budget outcomes since then.
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Less than a tenth of the cumulative boost provided by the terms of 
trade to Commonwealth budgets over the decade to 2012-13 
translated to better cash balances. Figure 4.9 captures the 
accumulated net effect of the three drivers on annual budgets 
over the decade.  
Figure 4.9 shows that: 
• The uplift in the terms of trade over 2002-3 levels provided 
support to accumulated budgets over the decade of about 
$190 billion. 
• Structural budget balances summed to an accumulated deficit 
over the decade of about $180 billion.  
• The business cycle (including the value of the stimulus in 
recent years) produced a net drag on accumulated budgets of 
about $100 billion.  
• The cash budget was in net deficit over the decade of about 
$100 billion. 
 
Figure 4.9: Commonwealth underlying cash budget balance and 
aggregate drivers: cumulative impact  
2012-13 $b 
 
Note:  2012-13 dollars; values deflated using financial year GDP deflator (ABS (2012d), 
Table 4) for 2002-03 to 2011-12. For 2012-13, the average of 3 available 
quarters is used to approximate the GDP deflator for 2012-13 (ABS (2012b), 
Table 5).  
Source:  Grattan analysis of Duggan et al. (2013); ABS (2012d), Table 1; ABS (2012b), 
Table 5; Budget 2013-14, Treasury; ATO database 2002-03-2010-11; Parkinson 
(2013); McDonald et al. (2010); The Treasury (2009). 
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4.4.2 Contribution of income and expenditure changes to 
the structural balance 
Income decreases and expenditure increases both contributed to 
the deterioration in the budget position, as Figure 4.10 shows.67  
The estimated ‘structural income’ of the Commonwealth 
government declined by over 3 per cent of nominal GDP from 
2002-03 to 2010-11, before starting to improve (see left panel of 
Figure 4.10). ‘Structural income’ is the income that would have 
resulted if cyclical influences on taxation (and other income) were 
zero. Major contributions to the declining income share were 
reductions in personal income tax rates, more generous tax 
concessions to superannuation, and shifts in the economy 
towards activities that attracted lower taxation.68 
The estimated ‘structural expenditure’ of the Commonwealth also 
increased over the period. Structural expenditure is an estimate of 
the expenditure that would have resulted if there had been no 
cyclical or temporary influences. Estimated structural expenditure 
rose by around 3 per cent of GDP over the decade, if the terms of 
trade increase since 2002-3 is considered temporary, as the 
upper line in the right panel of Figure 4.10 shows.  
                                            
67 We extract estimates of structural expenditure from Duggan, et al. (2013). The 
only components of spending affected by the business cycle in that model are 
the fiscal stimulus and the deviations in unemployment benefit payments from 
their structural level. Adding the residual structural balance to this structural 
expenditure gives of estimate of structural income.  
68 Structural income estimates are sensitive to modelling assumptions – see ibid. 
for sensitivity analysis. Government of Australia (2013) and Parkinson (2013) 
note the unexpectedly slow revenue recovery in recent years, some of which 
may be misattributed to declining structural income in this estimate. See Daley, 
et al. (2013) for analysis of factors driving changes in government revenues.  
Figure 4.10: Estimated Commonwealth structural income and 
expenditure 
% Nominal GDP 
 
Notes:  Structural income represents structural balance plus structural expenditure. 
Structural income and expenditure exclude GST. Structural expenditure 
represents total spending, less stimulus and the cyclical component of 
unemployment benefits (plus the terms of trade benefit in the ‘temporary’ case). 
The terms of trade uplift is the deviation from long – run average as defined in 
Footnote 65. 
Source:  Grattan analysis of Duggan et al. (2013); ABS (2012d), Table 1; ABS (2012b) 
Table 5; Budget 2013-14, Treasury; ATO database 2002-03-2010-11; Parkinson 
(2013); McDonald et al. (2010); The Treasury (2009). 
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pension rates and expenditure on health, education and 
infrastructure.69 
Even if all of the terms of trade uplift were assumed to be 
permanent, estimated structural expenditure still increased by 
about 1 percentage point of GDP beyond the rapid pace permitted 
by rapidly growing nominal GDP (as the lower line in the right 
panel of Figure 4.10 shows).  
4.4.3 Adjusting for public sector investment 
The above analysis concerns changes to the Commonwealth 
budget balance. Government saving is the budget balance plus 
Government investment in capital. Making the required 
adjustments to the budget balance estimates shows that the 
Commonwealth saved little of the terms of trade uplift. 
A narrow measure of government investment includes only fixed 
capital such as infrastructure.70 A broader measure considers 
public sector expenditure on health and education as investment 
in human capital, because it adds to the productive capacity of the 
economy or yields other enduring benefits.71 The allocation of that 
expenditure can thus be considered a broad form of saving. 
                                            
69 See Daley, et al. (2013) for analysis of changes in government expenditures.  
70 See ABS (2012d), Tables 30 and 32 for a decomposition of government net 
lending into gross saving and fixed capital investment. 
71 This point is recognized in the literature on saving from potentially temporary 
improvements in the terms of trade. See International Monetary Fund (2012), 
p.150 for a brief discussion.  
Figure 4.11: Narrow and broad measures of public sector 
investment 
Share of total expenditure 
 
Note:  Health and education is final consumption expenditure (FCE) only. Fixed capital 
investment includes health and education investment. The remainder of national 
government expenditure includes payments to the states for health and 
education. General Government is all levels of government.  
Source:  ABS (2012d), Table 1, 8, 30, 32, and 35  
Figure 4.11 shows that about 15 per cent of ‘National 
Government’ (almost entirely Commonwealth) expenditure 
directly funds health, education, and infrastructure. The remaining 
National Government expenditure includes transfers to the States 
that fund the same categories; the right panel of Figure 4.11 
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shows that they absorb about 35 per cent of ‘General 
Government’ (all levels of government) expenditure.  
The share of National Government expenditure going to the broad 
measure of investment rose by around 2 percentage points, or 0.4 
per cent of GDP, as Figure 4.11 shows. The share of General 
Government expenditure thus allocated grew by around 3 
percentage points, or around 1 per cent of GDP. The 
Commonwealth can take credit for some, but not all, of that 
increase.72 
Thus, there was some increase in expenditure on investment-like 
categories, but it was not big enough to overturn the conclusion 
that Commonwealth Government did not save much of the 
windfall from the elevated terms of trade.  
Successive Commonwealth governments appear to have treated 
the terms of trade windfall largely as if it were recurrent income: at 
least four-fifths of the decline in the structural balance from 2004-
5 to 2011-12 – a decline equal to five percentage points of GDP – 
was due to falling tax revenue, and increasing expenditure at the 
pre-boom expenditure shares of government consumption, 
transfers and investment. At most, one fifth of the decline in the 
structural balance – one percentage point of GDP – was due to 
heavier expenditure on investment.  
                                            
72 It is difficult to apportion changes in the mix of State government expenditure 
to State and Commonwealth governments as their respective funding decisions 
are not independent. 
4.5 To manage risks, government should exercise fiscal 
prudence and focus on economic flexibility 
Concerns about the economy’s stability due to the resource:  
boom and a larger resources sector are not fully borne out by the 
experience of comparable countries. There is cause for cautious 
optimism that the risks of the resources boom can be managed 
without a recession in the near term or much disruption in the 
longer term.  
Australian governments should strengthen the policies and 
institutions that have long supported stable growth and permitted 
adjustment through the current resources boom. They include 
inflation-targeted monetary policy, a floating exchange rate, 
decentralised wage setting and low trade barriers.73  
The Commonwealth Government also needs to save more while 
the terms of trade remain high, as long as growth remains close 
to trend. In correcting the current loose budget position, the 
Government should reduce expenditures that least benefit the 
community, and increase taxes that least distort the economy.  
It should also reframe its budget strategy. The current medium 
term strategy seeks to constrain taxation as a share of GDP 
below its 2007-08 level, and to achieve budget surpluses on 
average over the medium term.74 Those guidelines permitted 
spending to rise in line with nominal GDP as it was boosted by the 
terms of trade. Moreover, the base year for tax share of GDP was 
                                            
73 Gruen (2006); Productivity Commission (2012a) 
74 Government of Australia (2012), Part 3, Fiscal Strategy and Outlook 
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a year of unusually strong revenues. Tax cuts from around that 
time have eroded the revenue base. 
The Commonwealth should adapt its medium term fiscal strategy 
to explicitly recognise the budget uplift from the terms of trade and 
to return to saving most of it. Should the terms of trade remain 
elevated for an extended period, this saving target might be 
relaxed, but only after a significant buffer had been built. This 
formulation would focus attention on whether the changing budget 
position is sustainable.  
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5. Priorities for government
This report assessed community concerns about the resources 
boom. It found that:  
• The boom was not only good for miners. It also increased 
incomes broadly, with few losers. Economic growth supported 
low unemployment and high workforce participation. Strong 
demand for less formally qualified workers in mining and 
construction may even have offset trends in the economy 
towards more skill-intensive jobs, at least for a time. 
• While the boom put businesses in the trade-exposed non-
mining sectors under intense pressure, longer-term trends 
affecting the global location of manufacturing have been the 
dominant drivers of change to Australian manufacturing, even 
through the course of the boom. Trade-exposed industries 
seem unlikely to be permanently damaged: across countries 
they bounce back when the exchange rate adjusts.  
• There is some risk of a downturn as the mining boom slows, 
but the historical record suggests that a deep downturn is not 
inevitable should the boom suddenly end, provided that 
economic policy remains disciplined.  
However, public sector saving has been too low through the 
boom. Spending and tax decisions played important roles. The 
Commonwealth Government must now repair its budgetary 
position in more difficult times. 
 
What else should the Commonwealth Government do? 
• It should continue to invest in education and skills. Both are 
increasingly important to produce economic growth and to 
enable broad participation in its benefits. 
• It should move into budget surplus while economic growth 
remains near trend. The Commonwealth’s fiscal strategy 
should be amended to set spending targets so that a windfall 
from the terms of trade does not result in unsustainable 
spending increases or tax cuts. Over the longer term, it should 
maintain a higher rate of public sector saving until it is in a 
comfortable position to spread whatever benefits of the boom 
remain. 
• It should resist the temptation to protect trade-exposed 
industries. Protection is not a sensible way to promote the 
interests of the disadvantaged, support growth, or reduce risk. 
Instead, government should maintain a floating exchange rate, 
inflation-targeted interest rates, low trade barriers, 
decentralised wage determination and strong competition 
regulation. Finally, it should refocus on a robust productivity 
agenda.  
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Methodological appendix
A.1 Exchange rate episodes and the manufacturing 
industry 
This section provides additional detail on the exchange rate 
episodes analysed in Section 3.3. 
A.1.1 The main sample of exchange rate episodes 
We identified 13 episodes of real exchange rate variation in 
countries comparable to Australia. To select countries we started 
with the members of the OECD in 2012, plus several others for 
which data was available: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Taiwan, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
Ukraine.  
Within this group we identified currency episodes using the 
following criteria.  
1. Large and rapid shock: A fall in the in the Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (REER) of at least 15 per cent, occurring 
within three years. The bottom of the deviation is where the 
year-on-year rate of decline slows to below 10 per cent year 
on year.  
2. Enduring impact: At least two years until the REER again 
reaches half the value of the peak 
3. Discard external demand shocks: We eliminated several 
episodes that occurred during the Asian financial crisis in 
1997, and the world financial crisis in 2008. These had both 
exchange rate and export demand effects.  
Table A.1 Sample of 13 real effective exchange rate episodes 
Country Bottom of 
currency shock 
Country  Bottom of 
currency shock 
Australia 1986 Singapore 1986 
Brazil 1999 South Korea 1986 
Finland 1992 Spain 1993 
Italy 1993 Sweden 1993 
Japan 1997 Turkey 1994 
Mexico 1982 United States 1987 
Mexico 1995   
Grattan analysis of data from BIS (2013) and The World Bank (1960-2011)  
The 13 episodes are listed in Table A.1. The 13 episodes range 
from 1982 to 2002. Mostly were in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 
They are geographically diverse, including countries in Latin 
America, North America, East Asia and Europe. The large 
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depreciation Australia experienced in 1984-86 is included.75 
Across the sample, manufacturing value-added accounted for an 
average 22 per cent of GDP. All the episodes selected occurred 
after 1980, because the necessary manufacturing industry data is 
available from this date. 
The aim is to understand the effects of a depreciation caused by 
factors unrelated to the manufacturing sector on the 
manufacturing sector. The remaining sample may still include 
depreciations triggered at least in part by negative export demand 
or terms of trade shocks. This would tend to reduce the measured 
responsiveness of exports to exchange rate changes, not 
increase it. 
A.1.2 Separating real and nominal effects of depreciations 
Changes in the exchange rate affect the value of output. For 
example, an appreciation reduces the domestic currency value of 
manufacturing exports compared to GDP, even if manufacturing 
export volumes and GDP in volume terms were unchanged.  
As the aim of the analysis is to search for lasting effects on real 
manufacturing exports of temporarily elevated exchange rates, an 
approach was developed to reduce these valuation effects. We 
use the foreign currency value of manufacturing exports at market 
rates, and the domestic currency value of GDP. Indices of these 
are taken, based on their value at the date of most rapid 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. Taking the ratio of these 
indices gives an estimate of changes in the ratio of exports to 
                                            
75 See Blundell-Wignall, et al. (1993) for a discussion of the factors contributing 
to the depreciation of the Australian dollar from 1984 to 1986.  
GDP that largely excludes the direct affect of price on the value of 
those exports. In other words, it is close to a volume measure.76  
The GDP share of production is more difficult to adjust for 
valuation effects. Long-period volume indices are not available 
historically, and they are in any event difficult to compare to GDP 
because the production mix and prices change over time. The 
nominal gross value added as a share of GDP, therefore, includes 
price effects. However, the analysis uses a long (21 year) sample 
that permits us to confirm whether there is an enduring effect of 
temporary appreciations on manufacturing’s share of the 
economy. The size of the temporary impact of the exchange rate 
on manufacturing value added share of GDP does include both 
volume and price effects. 
A.2 Terms of trade episodes and GDP growth  
This section provides additional detail on the terms of trade 
episodes analysed in Section 4.2. 
We selected the resource-intensive countries most comparable to 
Australia, and identified historical terms of trade boom elevations 
that were followed by a significant fall. We asked what happened 
to GDP growth following those price reversals.  
A.2.1 The sample of countries 
We selected countries that are similar to Australia using four 
criteria that cover average income, resource-intensity, economic 
                                            
76 The valuation effect of depreciation on exports is not completely eliminated 
with this approach, because exporters that sell differentiated products maximize 
profits by permitting their margins to rise as the currency depreciates.  
The mining boom: impacts and prospects 
Grattan Institute 2013 49 
size, and economic diversity. We began with the The World Bank 
(1960-2011) dataset (198 countries, excluding aggregates).  
To ensure the historical record was relevant to Australia, we 
selected every economy that was: middle to high income; 
resource intensive (resource rent greater than 2% of GDP); 
medium to large economy (average in constant USD over 1960-
2011 greater than $45b); economically diverse (source). Eleven 
countries met these criteria. 
 
A.2.2 The sample of terms of trade boom episodes 
We then identified terms of trade booms that ended sharply. We 
identified 12 episodes that occurred in nine countries between 
1960 and 2011. We selected every episode for the sampled 
countries in which the terms of trade rose by at least 10 per cent 
above the moving average, stayed elevated for at least two years, 
then fell by at least 10 per cent followed by a period below the 
long-run moving average of at least two years. 77 Figure 5.7 shows 
the boom episodes in aggregate. The episodes are listed in Table 
A.2. 
                                            
77 We took the 21-year centred moving average for each country’s ‘long-run 
average’ terms of trade. The World Bank World Development Indicators 
database provides series only from 1960-2011. The centred averages are 
progressively truncated at the start and end of each country’s terms of trade 
series, down to a minimum of 11 years. At the start of the series, the moving 
average is a forward moving average; at the end, the moving average is a 
trailing moving average. To illustrate, the long-run average series begins in 
1960, using an 11-year average for the years 1960-1970. The following year, 
1961, uses a 12-year average 1960-71.  
On average the terms of trade increased by around 15 per cent in 
the two years before the terms of trade peak, then fell by just 
under 15 per cent in the following two years. The sample includes 
some bigger episodes that are similar in size to Australia’s current 
boom (Chile, Mexico, Brazil). Australia’s terms of trade have risen 
much more, and remained high for much longer, than the median 
episode in the sample. They rose 50 per cent in the five years to 
2007, and a further 30 per cent to 2011, and fell by more than 10 
per cent in the two years following.  
 
Table A.2: Sample of 12 terms of trade boom episodes in resource-
intensive economies comparable to Australia 
Country Terms of 
trade peak 
 Country  Terms of 
trade peak 
Argentina 1965  Mexico 1974 
Argentina 1981  Mexico 1981 
Australia 1974  New Zealand 1973 
Brazil 1977  Norway 1970 
Chile 1969  Norway 1981 
Malaysia 1980  South Africa 1980 
Grattan analysis of data from The World Bank (1960-2011) 
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